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Abstract
The startling number of cases in which prosecutors ignore clear-cut exculpatory
evidence and persist in the prosecution of an almost certainly innocent suspect may be
related to the public nature of these prosecutors’ commitments. Research has shown
that people who make a public commitment to a decision are more likely to stick with
their decision in the face of contrary evidence than people who did not make a public
commitment. This study examined the effects of public commitment on undergraduate
mock prosecutors’ decisions to prosecute in a fictional murder case. Half of the
participants rendered an initial decision which was made public and half of the
participants made no initial decision about the case. Participants were then given
exculpatory evidence and asked to make a second decision. It was predicted that
participants whose initial decision was made publicly would be more likely to remain
consistent with this decision (i.e., continue to prosecute) than participants who did not
make an initial decision. However, it was found that participants who made a public
commitment were significantly less likely to decide to prosecute in the face of
exculpatory evidence than participants who made no commitment. The implications of
this unexpected finding are discussed.
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Prosecutorial Perseveration: A Reaction to Public Commitment?
“We are all capable of believing things which we know to be untrue, and then, when we
are finally proved wrong, impudently twisting the facts so as to show they were right.
Intellectually, it is possible to carry on this process for an indefinite time: the only check
on it is that sooner or later a false belief bumps up against solid reality, usually on the
battlefield.”
-George Orwell, "In Front of Your Nose," 1946/1968
In the early 1600s, opponents of the sun-centered theory of the universe refused
to look into Galileo’s telescope to acknowledge his evidence (Kuhn, 1957). Today,
prosecutors in Macon, Mississippi are seeking to bring new charges against Kennedy
Brewer. Brewer was recently released from prison after DNA evidence showed that the
semen found on the three-year-old girl he was convicted of raping and murdering did not
belong to him (Dewan, 2007). It appears as though the prosecutors in this case are
refusing to acknowledge evidence of Brewer’s innocence, just as Galileo’s critics
refused to look into his telescope.
Kennedy Brewer is not alone in having prosecutors persist in claims that he
committed a crime which DNA evidence shows he could not have committed. In
Durham, North Carolina, District Attorney Mike Nifong persisted in pursuing a gang rape
case against members of the Duke Lacrosse team even though the alleged victim gave
inconsistent accounts of the crime and DNA evidence did not link any players to her.
Nifong withdrew from the case in January 2007 and was found guilty of criminal
contempt and disbarred. Charges against the Duke Lacrosse players were eventually
dropped (Beard, 2007).
Take also the case of Jeff Deskovic. In 1989 the 16-year-old falsely confessed to
raping and murdering a classmate, believing that DNA evidence would prove his
innocence. Though the DNA did not match Deskovic, the prosecutor pursued the case
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against him, arguing that semen taken from the victim came from a consensual sexual
partner and that Deskovic killed her in a jealous rage. The jury convicted Deskovic,
whose conviction was overturned in 2006 on grounds of actual innocence when new
DNA tests linked the semen to a convicted felon (Santos, 2006).
Why do these cases happen? As Galileo’s opponents demonstrated in the 1600s
and as George Orwell observed in 1946, people are capable of ignoring evidence that
contradicts what they believe. This has also been shown in social psychology research –
Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) found that participants were more likely to accept
evidence that confirmed their view and were more critical of evidence that disconfirmed
their view, even if the evidence was of equal strength. Cialdini (2001) argued that people
have a need to be consistent – once a person makes a commitment he or she will act in
a manner that is consistent with that commitment, especially if the commitment is made
publicly. One example Cialdini cited is a study by Sherman (1980) in which researchers
asked residents via a phone survey to predict what they would say if asked to spend
three hours volunteering for a charity. Most people predicted they would say yes and
there was a dramatic increase in the number of volunteers recruited a few days later.
Stults and Messe (1985) found that participants who made a public commitment
behaved more consistently with their original intention over time. Watt (1965) similarly
found that participants who had committed to their decision by writing it and justifying it
to another person were more resistant to changing their estimate than participants who
had simply written their estimates or who had not written their estimates at all.
The current study seeks to expand upon these findings and to shed light on the
phenomenon that will be referred to here as "prosecutorial perseveration," in which
prosecutors continue to pursue a suspect even when the evidence of innocence
2

becomes quite strong. Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines perseveration as “the
continuation of something usually to an exceptional degree or beyond a desired point.”
Clearly, prosecutors who continue to prosecute in the face of exculpatory evidence are
continuing to prosecute beyond the point desired by our legal system.
In this study, participants were presented with evidence from a murder case in
which the evidence against the suspected perpetrator was quite strong. Half of the
participants were asked to make a public decision about whether or not the case should
be prosecuted and the other half were not asked to make a decision. Because the
evidence against the suspect was strong, most participants who made a decision were
expected to decide to prosecute (in fact, the results of pilot testing indicated that 75% of
participants decided to prosecute upon reading the case). Participants were then given
either weak or strong exculpatory evidence about the suspect. The weak exculpatory
evidence included an eyewitness account and one piece of physical evidence (a receipt)
while the strong exculpatory evidence included an additional piece of physical evidence
(DNA). This strength of exculpatory evidence manipulation is consistent with Skolnick
and Shaw’s (2001) finding that mock jurors find physical evidence more compelling than
eyewitness evidence. It was expected that participants who made a public commitment
would be less likely to prosecute (to change their opinion) than participants who made
no commitment. It was also expected that participants who received strong exculpatory
evidence would be less likely to prosecute than participants who received weak
exculpatory evidence. Participants in the study were also administered the Pretrial Juror
Attitudes Questionnaire (Lecci & Myers, 2008), which measures pre-trial bias (higher
scores indicate a conviction bias) and the Self-Monitoring Questionnaire (Snyder, 1974),
which measures a person’s tendency to control one’s behavior for social
3

appropriateness. A secondary prediction of the study is that participants who exhibited
more conviction bias on the Pretrial Juror Attitudes Questionnaire (PJAQ) would be less
likely to change their opinion (more likely to prosecute) than participants who
demonstrated less bias. This is hypothesized because participants who scored higher
on the PJAQ are predicted to act in accordance with the Crime Control Model (Packer,
1964), which emphasizes a belief in the importance of punishment, and participants who
score lower on the PJAQ are expected to act in accordance with the Due Process Model
(Packer, 1964), which emphasizes the importance on the protection of due process
rights. It was also expected that participants who are high self-monitors would be more
likely to prosecute than participants who demonstrate lower self-monitoring. High SelfMonitors are expected to feel a greater need to appear consistent (and thus be more
likely to prosecute in the face of exculpatory evidence) than low self-monitors.

4

Method

Participants
Three-hundred fifty-nine students from a southwestern university participated in
the study for course credit. The mean age of participants was 20.27 years old (SD =
3.75) with a range from 17 to 45 years. Females compromised 64.5% of the sample.
79.5% of participants identified themselves as Hispanic, 3.1% as African American,
0.4% as Native American, 7.7% as Non-Hispanic White, 1.2% as Asian, and 6.2% as of
another background. Demographic information is missing for four participants who
received stimuli from which the demographic questionnaire was missing. An additional
four participants failed to report their age and/or year of birth. One participant failed to
complete the last page of her stimuli, which included four questions on the SM
questionnaire and the demographic questionnaire.

Procedure
After completing a consent form (see Appendix A), participants were given a
short summary of a murder case (see Appendix B) which asked them to imagine that
they were the prosecuting attorney and to decide if there was enough evidence to take
the case to trial. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two commitment
conditions: Public Commitment or No Commitment.
Participants in the Public Commitment condition were asked to complete the First
Prosecution Decision by indicating and explaining their decision on a piece of paper,
which they signed and turned in to the experimenter to be publicly displayed on a
bulletin board in the experimental laboratory (see Appendix C). Participants in the Public
Commitment condition were required to walk past the bulletin board when they first
entered the laboratory but they were not required to read the board. In fact, it was
5

placed at a slight distance from them, so they would not be able to easily read other
participants’ decisions (to avoid undue influence of other people’s opinions). After the
participant’s experiment session was complete, their decisions were removed from the
board in order to protect the subject’s confidentiality. However, there were several (3-4)
fake decisions posted on the board for every session.
In the No Commitment condition, participants were not asked to make a First
Prosecution Decision about bringing charges in the case. Participants in both conditions
were run in groups of 1 to three people.
After participants completed this stage of the experiment they worked briefly on a
distracter task (a word search puzzle) before they were presented with exculpatory
evidence. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two different levels of
exculpatory evidence: Weak Exculpatory Evidence (see Appendix D) and Strong
Exculpatory Evidence (see Appendix E). Once participants read the exculpatory
evidence, they were asked to render a second decision, the Second Prosecution
Decision, which indicated whether they would pursue charges against the defendant or
not (see Appendix F).
Lastly, participants completed the Pretrial Juror Attitudes Questionnaire (see
Appendix G), the Self-Monitoring scale, and a short demographic questionnaire (see
Appendix H). After the participants completed these scales, they were debriefed (see
Appendix I).

Materials
Case Summary and Exculpatory Evidence. A short summary was used which
described the evidence in a murder case (see Appendix B). In this case, which was
actually fictional, the police suspected an ex-boyfriend, Frank Parker, of having
6

murdered Marie Smith, his ex-girlfriend. No one was able to confirm Parker's alibi that
he was on the other side of town running errands at the time the murder occurred. A
neighbor of the victim picked Parker out of a line-up as the man who had been seen
leaving the victim’s apartment. Furthermore, Parker’s fingerprints were found in the
victim’s apartment. The summary also mentioned that there were unidentified
fingerprints at the crime scene and that there had been other daytime robberies in the
area of the victim's apartment.
The bulk of the evidence against Frank Parker was incriminating and it was
expected that, based on this evidence, nearly all participants would decide to pursue
charges against him. Participants in the Public Commitment condition were asked to
indicate their First Prosecution Decision on a 6-point Likert scale from 1 = I would
definitely charge Frank Parker with murder to 6 = I would definitely not charge Frank
Parker with murder (See Appendix C).
Once participants reviewed the case summary and made their First Prosecution
Decision, they were informed that the police had uncovered new information about the
case. The participants were then presented with additional weak (see Appendix D) or
strong (see Appendix E) exculpatory evidence. The Weak Exculpatory Evidence tended
to support Frank Parker's alibi. Specifically, this weak evidence consisted of an alibi
provided by a cashier at a grocery store accompanied by a receipt. The Strong
Exculpatory Evidence included the weak exculpatory evidence (i.e., the receipt and
statement from the cashier at the convenience story) as well as DNA evidence which
showed that skin samples found underneath the victim’s fingernails (apparently there
from scratching her murderer) did not match the DNA type of Frank Parker. After
reading the weak or strong exculpatory evidence, participants were asked to indicate
7

their Second Prosecution Decision, using the same scale as the First Prosecution
Decision.
The case summary and exculpatory evidence were pilot tested with 53
undergraduate students. Participants in the pilot study were given one of three versions
of the case summary: the case summary, the case summary with weak exculpatory
evidence, or the case summary with strong exculpatory evidence. When participants
read the case summary alone, 75.0% indicted that they would prosecute. When weak
exculpatory evidence was included, this number dropped to 50.0% and when strong
exculpatory evidence was included, it dropped even further to 26.3%.

Pretrial Juror Attitudes Questionnaire (PJAQ). Participants completed the Pretrial
Juror Attitudes Questionnaire (Lecci & Myers, 2008) which measures on six factors:
conviction proneness, system confidence, cynicism towards the defense, racial bias,
social justice, and innate criminality (see Appendix G). The PJAQ contains 29
statements to which participants can respond on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 5
(strongly disagree). Five items load on conviction proneness, six items load on system
confidence, seven items load on cynicism towards the defense, and four items each
load on social justice, racial bias, and innate criminality. Higher scores on all scales
indicated a conviction bias. In creating this scale, the authors first conducted
confirmatory factor analyses and produced a 29-item, 6 factor scale. This scale was
than cross-validated in a sample of 300 participants and was found to have a high
average fit index. Subscales of the PJAQ were found to have high shared variance with
related scales of other measures of juror attitudes (such as the Juror Bias Scale and the
Legal Attitudes Questionnaire). Five out of six scales (all but social justice) were found
to correlate highly with verdict over different types of trials and evidence.
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Self-Monitoring Scale (SM). Participants also completed the Self-Monitoring
Scale (Snyder, 1974), a 25-item instrument which assesses self-monitoring. SelfMonitoring is the extent to which a person manages their self-presentation and behavior
in response to cues from a social situation (see Appendix H). This scale was found to
have a test-retest reliability of .83. High scores on the SM questionnaire were correlated
with high peer ratings of self-monitoring and individuals who scored high on selfmonitoring were more likely to seek social comparison information than low selfmonitors.

Demographic Questionnaire. Participants completed a short questionnaire about
their age, gender, race, major, and dominant language (see Appendix H).

9

Results
The dependent variable in the present study was participants' ratings on the
Second Prosecutor Decision. Between-groups ANOVAs were performed to examine
the main effects of and interaction between commitment type and evidence strength on
the Second Prosecutor Decision. It was predicted that there would be a main effect for
commitment type, such that participants who made a public commitment would be more
likely to prosecute on the Second Prosecution Decision than participants who made no
commitment. It was also predicted that participants who received weak exculpatory
evidence would be more likely to prosecute on the Second Prosecution Decision than
participants who received strong exculpatory evidence. Lastly, it was predicted that
participants who scored higher on the PJAQ or SM questionnaires would be more likely
to prosecute than participants who scored lower on these scales.
The variable Second Prosecution Decision was reverse coded for these analyses
so that “1” represents ‘I would definitely not prosecute Frank Parker for murder’ and ‘6’
represents ‘I would definitely prosecute Frank Parker for murder’. Therefore, higher
scores on Second Prosecution Decision indicate that someone is more likely to
prosecute and lower scores indicate that someone is less likely to prosecute.
The main effect for commitment type (public commitment vs. no commitment)
was significant, F (1, 255) = 11.36, p < .01, η² = .04, but in the opposite direction from
what had been predicted. Specifically, participants in the no commitment condition (M =
3.26, SD = 1.21) were more likely to prosecute on the Second Prosecutor Decision than
participants in the public commitment condition (M = 2.77, SD = 1.28) on a scale from 16 where 1 = definitely not prosecute and 6 = definitely prosecute (see Table 1).
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As predicted, the main effect for exculpatory evidence strength was also
significant, F (1, 255) = 24.50, p < .001, η² = .09. Specifically, participants in the weak
exculpatory evidence condition were significantly more likely to prosecute (M = 3.39, SD
= 1.16) than participants in the strong exculpatory evidence condition (M = 2.65, SD =
1.26). The interaction between commitment type and exculpatory evidence strength was
not significant, F (1, 255) = .47, p = .49, η² < .01.
The data were examined to determine whether participants’ Second Prosecution
Decision differed, based on whether participants’ First Prosecution Decision was to
prosecute or not to prosecute. The means of each group on the Second Prosecution
Decision, broken down according to participants’ First Prosecution Decision, are
presented in Table 2. Because members of the no commitment condition did not record
a First Prosecution Decision, their Second Prosecution Decision could not be broken
down in this way. However, the means of the Second Prosecution Decision for the no
commitment group are presented in Table 2 for purposes of comparison.
Visual inspection of the means in Table 2 did not reveal any unexpected patterns.
That is, the pattern of means for the Second Prosecution Decision for all groups was
consistent with what would be expected based on three main effects: (a) participants
who decided to prosecute on the First Prosecution Decision were more likely to decide
to prosecute on the Second Prosecution Decision, compared with participants who
decided not to prosecute on the First Prosecution Decision, (b) participants in the Public
Commitment condition were less likely than those in the No Commitment condition to
prosecute on the Second Prosecution Decision, and (c) participants in the Strong
Exculpatory Evidence condition were less likely than those in the Weak Exculpatory
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Evidence condition to prosecute on the Second Prosecution Decision. No unexpected
interactions of these three main effects were observed in the means of Table 2.
A hierarchical regression was next conducted with Second Prosecutor Decision
as the criterion and with the demographic variables age, gender (dummy coded as Male
= 0, Female = 1), and ethnicity (dummy coded as three dichotomous predictor variables
- Hispanic, African American, and White Non-Hispanic) as first step predictors (see
Table 3). Commitment type and Strength of Exculpatory Evidence were used as second
step predictors. Scores on the Self-Monitoring questionnaire and the Pre-trial Juror
Attitudes Questionnaire were centered and used as predictors in the third step.
Participants lacking complete demographic information were excluded from the
hierarchical regression as was one participant who indicated ‘Strongly Disagree’ to
every item on the PJAQ.
The first step of the hierarchical regression (demographic variables) was not
significant, R² = 0.02, F (5, 245) = 0.89, p = .49, ∆R² = 0.02, F (2, 245) = .89, p = .49.
However, the second step, which included commitment type and strength of exculpatory
evidence was statistically significant, R² = 0.14, F (7, 243) = 5.85, p < .001, ∆R² = 0.13,

F (2, 243) = 17.95, p < .001 as was the third step which included the Self-Monitoring
questionnaire and the Pre-trial Juror Attitudes Questionnaire, R² = 0.17, F (9, 241) =
5.54, p < .001, ∆R² =.03, F (2, 241) = 3.96, p = .02.
In the third step of the hierarchical regression, when all predictors were entered
simultaneously, three variables were found to significantly contribute to the regression
equation: (1) Commitment, Standardized B = -.21, t = -3.49, p = .001, (2) Strength of
Exculpatory Evidence, Standardized B = -.29, t = -4.90, p <.001, and (3) PJAQ total
score, Standardized B = .17, t = 2.81, p = .005. These results indicated that participants
12

in the public commitment condition were less likely to prosecute than participants in the
no commitment condition. Participants who received Strong Exculpatory Evidence were
less likely to prosecute than participants who receive Weak Exculpatory Evidence.
Lastly, participants with higher scores on the PJAQ (indicating a conviction bias) were
more likely to prosecute. Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients for all the variables
included in the regression analysis.
Lastly, in an exploratory analysis of the data, a change score was computed for
each participant in the Public Commitment Condition, by subtracting First Prosecution
Decision from their Second Prosecution Decision. Higher scores indicate a greater
change from their first to second decision. A hierarchical regression was computed with
Strength of Evidence and First Prosecution Decision as predictors in the first step,
centered PJAQ total score as a predictor in the second step, and the interactions
between centered PJAQ scores and Strength of Evidence and centered PJAQ scores
and First Prosecution Decision as predictors in the third step. Though all three steps of
the regression were significant, the change in R², was not significant for the second or
third step. The first step was significant, R ² = .31, F (2, 128) = 28.37, p <.001. Both First
Prosecution Decision (Standardized B = .39, t = 5.22, p < .001) and Strength of
Exculpatory Evidence (Standardized B = .37, t = 5.02, p < .001) contributed significantly
to the model. Though both the second step (R² = 0.56, F (3, 125) = 19.18, p < .001, ∆R²
=.01, F (1, 125) = 0.86, p = .356) and third step (R² = 0.57, F (5, 123) = 11.66, p < .001,
∆R² =.01, F (2, 123) = 0.58, p = .563) of the model were significant, none of additional
variables contributed significantly to the model.
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Discussion
This study has three notable main findings. First, as predicted, participants who
received Strong Exculpatory Evidence were less likely to prosecute than participants
who received Weak Exculpatory Evidence. Second, contrary to prediction, participants
in the Public Commitment condition were less likely to prosecute after receiving
exculpatory evidence than participants in the No Commitment condition. Lastly,
participants’ scores on the PJAQ were a significant predictor of their Second
Prosecution Decision. Each of these findings will be discussed below.

Strength of Exculpatory Evidence
Participants who reviewed strong exculpatory evidence were less likely to
prosecute on the Second Prosecution Decision than participants who reviewed weak
exculpatory evidence. This finding is clearly consistent with Skolnick and Shaw’s (2001)
findings that jurors were more influenced by physical evidence than by eyewitness
evidence and that stronger evidence was more influential than weaker evidence. This
suggests that mock prosecutors make their decision (at least in part) on the basis of the
strength of evidence though cognitive biases and misconduct may also play a role
(Burke, 2006).

Commitment
Though there was an effect for type of commitment, it was in the opposite
direction hypothesized based on previous research. In this study, participants who made
a public commitment were less likely to prosecute in the face of exculpatory evidence
than participants who made no commitment. This finding is unexpected based on the
extensive body of research on public commitment, which has consistently found that
participants who make a public commitment are less likely to change their minds than
14

participants who have not made a public commitment (Sherman, 1980; Stults & Meese,
1985; Watt, 1965).
There are a number of possible explanations for the present unexpected findings.
The first is that perhaps, instead of making a public commitment to a specific decision,
participants felt they were making a public commitment to “seeking justice” or some
other ideal. If this was the case, we would expect participants who made a public
commitment to be less likely to prosecute in the face of exculpatory evidence.
Another possible explanation is that participants in the public commitment
condition were overcorrecting for perceived bias in their original decision. The Flexible
Corrections Model of Bias Correction holds that individuals will attempt to correct
perceived biases even if the bias has not actually occurred (Wegener, Kerr, Fleming, &
Petty, 2000). Perhaps participants in the Public Commitment condition felt that their
original decision was biased (since they had not receive the exculpatory evidence).
Because participants in the No Commitment condition did not make a First Prosecution
Decision they could not have perceived it as biased. If participants in the public
commitment condition felt that they had been duped into making a decision to
prosecute, they may have been more likely to change their decision than the
participants in the no commitment condition.
In light of this study’s unexpected findings concerning the effect of public
commitment, another question arises whether the study’s operationalization of public
commitment was adequate. Two points are relevant when considering this question.
First, the operationalization of public commitment in the present study was consistent
with the operationalization used in at least one previous classic study on the effects of
public commitment (e.g., Watt, 1965). Second, even if it is the case that the
15

commitment in the present study was not “public” enough, the results are still at odds
with findings which indicate that commitment affects later decisions, even when the
commitment is not public. For example, Dysart, Lindsay, Hammond, and Dupuis (2001)
found that participants who picked out a non-target mugshot were more likely to choose
that same person in a lineup than participants who had not made an initial decision.
Memon, Hope, Bartlett, and Bull (2002) ran a similar study and concluded that selection
of a mugshot influenced lineup identification.
A closely related issue concerns ecological validity. How does this manipulation
of public commitment in the present study compare to what prosecutors actually
experience? It may be that the task in this study does not replicate what prosecutors
face. One way future research can address this concern is by having participants make
their decision to a video camera which they are told is being viewed by others in another
room. A manipulation like this may more closely replicate a prosecutor’s experience
when making a declaration to the media.

Pretrial Juror Attitude Questionnaire (PJAQ)
Consistent with prediction, participants in the present study who scored higher on
the PJAQ were more likely to prosecute than participants who scored lower on the
PJAQ. Higher scores on the PJAQ represent a conviction bias and it is not surprising
that people who are biased towards conviction may also be biased towards prosecution.
Morris and Lecci (2005) found that the PJAQ predicted evidence selection, the
evaluation of evidence, and verdict tendencies. This study not only supports the
predictive validity of the PJAQ but also extends previous research into the realm of
prosecutor attitudes.
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This is the first study (to the author’s best knowledge) that has used the PJAQ to
predict mock prosecutors’ decision in a criminal case. It appears that prosecutors and
jurors alike are influenced not only by strength of evidence but also by their preexisting
attitudes.

Self-Monitoring Questionnaire
Scores on the Self-Monitoring Questionnaire were not related to Second
Prosecution Decision. It was expected that participants who were high self-monitors
would be more likely to prosecute on the Second Prosecution Decision (i.e., they would
be more likely to remain consistent). Scores on self-monitoring were in no way related to
Second Prosecution Decision, suggesting, perhaps, that participants were not
concerned with how others would view their decision. This finding is not too surprising in
light of the finding that public commitment did not have the hypothesized effect. The
need to appear consistent with one’s original decision did not have an effect on Second
Prosecutorial Decision; because there was no need to appear consistent, selfmonitoring scores could not help differentiate the people who were consistent from
those who were not consistent.
An alternative hypothesis for the relation between self-monitoring and
prosecution decisions deserves note. Research suggests that participants who are low
self-monitors exhibit more consistency between their attitudes and their actions than
participants who are high-self monitors (Snyder, 1979). The alternative hypothesis
would therefore be that low self-monitors would be more likely to prosecute after
receiving exculpatory evidence than high-self monitors. This would only be true if the
consistency in their behavior reflected their true inner beliefs (Snyder, 1979).
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In the present study, participants were expected to act in a way that made them appear
consistent, by continuing to prosecute in the face of exculpatory evidence. Low selfmonitors would be expected to act in accordance with their beliefs, not social pressures
to appear consistent. Therefore, if low self-monitors found the exculpatory evidence
persuasive, they would be expected to act according to their new beliefs.

Practical Implications
If these findings are replicated, it would appear that public commitment does not
affect mock prosecutors’ decisions. If this finding can be generalized to real prosecutors,
the present findings suggest that prosecutors should be encouraged to discuss their
cases with colleagues, especially since participants who made no public commitment
were more likely to prosecute in the face of exculpatory evidence.
However, much more research needs to be conducted before any policy
recommendations can be made. Public commitment, as operationalized in this study,
may not be the same as a public commitment made to a colleague or to the public
through the media, such as on the news or in a newspaper and therefore may lack
external validity.

Limitations of the Present Study
There are several limitations to the current study. The first is that this study used
undergraduates as mock prosecutors. Clearly, there could be a problem with external
validity because there could be a difference in the legal decision making of
undergraduates versus practicing lawyers. Another limitation is the lack of a Private
Commitment Condition, in which participants are asked to make a decision but to keep it
to themselves. Similarly, the Public Commitment manipulation in this study may not
replicate the types of public commitment prosecutors may have to make (such as
18

commitments in front of their co-workers or the media). Another potential limitation of
this study is that all participants were exposed to the same case; these findings may not
generalize over different types of crime.
Another concern with external validity is that in real life prosecutors may have to
make a dichotomous choice, either to prosecute or not prosecute. Thus the use of a six
point Likert scale, as in the present study, may not reflect the same choices that would
be made in a yes/no dichotomy. Future research could address this concern by having
participants complete both a yes/no and a Likert choice. A related concern is that
prosecutor’s might have the option of not deciding about a case until they receive more
evidence. Perhaps future research should also include the option to not decide.
The delay between First Prosecution Decision and receiving exculpatory
evidence was short. This may not have allowed participant’s decisions to ‘sink in’.
Future research may increase the time between making the First Prosecution Decision
and receiving exculpatory evidence.
The manipulation of public commitment used in the present study may not have
required participants to “own” their decision. That is, they may not have felt that other
people would see their decision and thus did not feel strongly connected to it. Future
research should manipulate the public commitment in a way that results in the
participants feeling strongly attached to their original decision. This could be done by
posting decisions on-line, videotaping responses, or telling participants the video of their
response is being fed to another room in which it is being observed and critiqued.

Future Directions
Future research should manipulate public commitment in a way which is more
ecologically similar to what prosecutors do. One way to do this would be to have
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participants make their decision to a video camera which they are told is being viewed
by others in another room.
Cialdini (2001) also points out that these choices must be made freely. In this
study, participants were forced to make a prosecution decision which was then posted
publicly. Perhaps future research could examine the effects of giving participants the
opportunity to not decide (such as an ‘I don’t know’ response option) and the effect of
allowing participants to make a voluntary public commitment.
Because the findings of the present study regarding the effects of commitment
were unexpected and are limited to a case involving murder charges, a follow-up study
is being implemented which will seek to replicate these findings using both the same
case and a rape case. This study will also examine the effects of an additional
manipulation of public commitment and the correlation between Need for Cognition (NC)
and Second Prosecution Decision. Research has shown that people with high NC are
more likely to try to correct their bias than people will low NC (DeSteno, Petty, Wegener,
& Rucker, 2000). There were participants in both conditions who indicated they would
prosecute, even in the face of exculpatory evidence. The next question to try to answer
is what sets these people apart? The Need for Cognition is one of many potential
variables that might help discriminate between people who ignore exculpatory evidence
and people who integrate it into their new decision.
Another direction for future research is to examine the impact of cognitive
dissonance on prosecutorial decision making. Cognitive dissonance occurs when there
is conflict between a person’s cognitions, or between the person’s actions and
cognitions. Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999) suggest that resistance to changing a
cognition is related to the amount of pain or losses that must be endured if change
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occurs. It is possible that the participants in the present study did not face great enough
consequences for appearing inconsistent. Future research may try to increase the
consequences of inconsistency in an ecologically valid manner.
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Table 1

Mean Second Prosecutorial Decision Score as a Function of Commitment Type and
Strength of Exculpatory Evidence (N = 259)

Exculpatory Evidence
Commitment Type

Weak

Strong

Public Commitment

3.17 (sd = 1.18)
n = 64

2.35 (sd = 1.24) 2.77 (sd = 1.28)
n = 65
n = 129

No Commitment

3.58 (sd = 1.12)
n = 65

2.95 (sd = 1.22) 3.24 (sd = 1.21)
n = 65
n = 130

Combined

3.39 (sd = 1.16)
n = 129

2.65 (sd = 1.26)
n = 130
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Combined

Table 2

Mean Score on First and Second Prosecutorial Decision by First Prosecution Decision
Type and Evidence Strength
Mean on First Prosecution Decision
Exculpatory Evidence Strength
Weak

Strong

Prosecute

4.68 (n = 50)

4.64 (n = 55)

Not Prosecute

2.29 (n = 14)

2.60 (n = 10)

No Commitment

n/a (n = 65)

n/a (n = 65)

First Prosecution Decision Type

Mean on Second Prosecution Decision
Exculpatory Evidence Strength
Weak

Strong

Prosecute

3.50

2.44

Not Prosecute

2.07

1.90

No Commitment

3.58

2.95

First Prosecution Decision Type
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Table 3

Hierarchical Regression of Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Commitment, Evidence Strength,
PJAQ Score, and SM Score on Second Prosecutorial Decision (N = 250)
Variable

Unstdzd Β

SE Β

Stdzd Β

t

p

Step 1 (R² = 0.02, F (5, 245) = 0.89, p = .49)
Age
0.01
Gender (Female)
0.17
Hispanic
-0.11
African American
-0.95
White (Non-Hispanic) -0.248

0.02
0.17
0.31
0.54
0.41

0.03
0.07
-0.03
-0.13
-0.05

0.49
1.02
-0.36
-1.77
-0.61

0.623
0.309
0.722
0.078
0.546

Step 2 (R² = 0.14, F (7, 243) = 5.85, p < .001, ∆R² = 0.13, F (2, 243) = 17.95, p < .001)
Age
Gender (Female)
Hispanic
African American
White (Non-Hispanic)
Commitment
Evidence

0.01
0.10
-0.11
-0.75
-0.19
-0.53
-0.72

0.02
0.16
0.29
0.50
0.39
0.15
0.15

0.04
-0.04
-0.03
-0.11
-0.04
-0.21
-0.29

0.66
0.61
-0.38
-1.50
-0.49
-3.55
-4.80

0.511
0.546
0.707
0.135
0.626
<.001
<.001

Step 3 (R² = 0.17, F (9, 241) = 5.54, p < .001, ∆R² =.03, F (2, 241) = 3.96, p = .02)
Age
Gender (Female)
Hispanic
African American
White (Non-Hispanic)
Commitment
Evidence
PJAQ Total
SM Total

0.10
0.06
-0.11
-0.73
-0.18
-0.51
-0.73
0.02
-0.003

0.02
0.16
0.29
0.50
0.39
0.15
0.15
0.01
0.02
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0.04
0.02
-0.03
-0.10
-0.04
-0.21
-0.29
0.17
-0.01

0.65
0.36
-0.38
-1.45
-0.46
-3.49
-5.00
2.81
-0.12

0.517
0.721
0.701
0.148
0.646
0.001
<.001
0.005
0.903

Table 4

Correlation between Regression Variables (N=252)
Variable
1. Hispanic

1
1.00

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

2. African American -.38** 1.00
3. White

-.62** -.05

1.00

4. Female

.03

.13* -.04

1.00

5. Age

-.10

.02

.10

-.11

1.00

6. Commitment

.00

.05

-.03

.06

.07

1.00

7. Evidence

-.06

.05

.06

-.13* -.01

.00

8. SM Score

-.09

.13*

.12

-.15** -.15* -.01

.14* 1.00

9. PJAQ Score

.05

.00

-.07

.10

-.03

.03

10. Second
.05
Prosecution Decision
*≤.05, **≤.01

.11

-.02

.05

.02
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-.05

1.00

.01

1.00

-.21** -.30** -.07

.16*

1.00

Appendix A: Informed Consent
Informed Consent Form
IRB # 78084-1
1. Study Title: Prosecutorial Decision Making
2. Purpose of the Study: To investigate prosecutorial decision making. You are invited to participate in this
research because you are presently enrolled in a psychology course at the University of Texas, El Paso. You
must be at least 18 years old to participate.
3. Study Procedures: You will read a case summary about a murder and/or sexual assault investigation. You
will be asked to imagine you are a prosecutor in the case and to assess merits of the evidence. The study will
take place in an assigned room in the Psychology Building or Vowell Hall, and will last approximately 20-30
minutes.
4. Risks: The major risk to participating in this study is that you might become upset when you read about the
alleged murder and/or sexual assault-especially if you or someone you know has been victimized in a similar
manner or situation. These risks are unlikely, but if you are concerned about them you may withdraw from the
study now with no penalty. Withdrawal will in no way jeopardize your relationship with your course instructor or
with the University of Texas, El Paso. Instead of participating in this study, you may obtain extra credit by
participating in other studies. If you choose to participate and do develop problems, you may discuss them with
the experimenter, or contact the UTEP University Counseling Center, 747-5302.
5. Benefits: This study is not designed to help you personally, and there are no direct benefits. However, you
will learn a little bit about how psychological research is conducted in this domain. If you would like to learn
more about the study (including final results) you may ask the experimenter or contact Dr. Jim Wood (747-6570,
jawood@utep.edu).
6. Privacy: All data collected in this study are anonymous. We will not be able to identify you from your
responses. The data will be stored in a locked cabinet in the investigator’s office, for 5 years after the
publication of results from the study. Any publications will present only summary results of our findings-no
individuals will be identified.
7. Compensation: You will receive one-half hour of research credit for your participation.
8. Questions: You may ask questions of the experimenter and have those questions answered, before
agreeing to participate or during the research. If you have additional questions, you may call the researcher at
the number below-please do not use the Psychology Dept office phone number. If you have any questions
about your rights as a research participant that have not been answered by the investigator or to report any
concerns about the study, you may contact the University of Texas, El Paso Office of Research and Sponsored
Projects, telephone (917) 747-7939 or irb.orsp@utep.edu.
9. Signature: You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without penalty.
Your decision will not affect your relationship with the researchers or UTEP, and it will not result in any loss of
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You are voluntarily making a decision whether or not to participate
in this study. Your signature below certifies that you have voluntarily decided to participate, and have read and
understood the information presented. You may have a copy of this consent form to keep.

Participant Signature

Date

Name and Contact Information of Principal Investigator:
Elizabeth Uhl
747-8802
eruhl@miners.utep.edu
Name and Contact Information of Supervisor:
James Wood, Ph.D.
jawood@utep.edu
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Appendix B: Case Summary
Imagine you are a prosecuting attorney for the District Attorney's office for the County of El
Paso. It is your job to decide which cases should be brought to trial and which charges should
be dropped. You are being asked to review a murder case and decide if the suspect should be
prosecuted or not. In order to prosecute someone, you must have probable cause that they
committed the crime. Probable cause is a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed
and that the suspect committed the crime. As a prosecutor, it is not your job to decide if the
defendant is guilty or not, that decision will be left up to the jury or the judge. As a prosecutor,
you only have to decide if there is a reasonable belief that the suspect committed the crime.
In the state of Texas, a person commits murder if he meets any one of the following three
criterions:
(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual;
(2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to
human life that causes the death of an individual; or
(3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the
course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the
commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human
life that causes the death of an individual.
Please read the following murder case summary from the perspective of a prosecutor.
Case # 29BL71022
Police answered an emergency call from 911 on August 16, 2007 at 10:30 in the
morning. A neighbor of Marie Smith called the police because he heard loud yelling coming from
her apartment. When the police arrived, they found the victim dead in her kitchen. The victim’s
jewelry and money were missing. There had been two other day time break-ins in the El Paso
area in the last month. In both cases, money and other valuables had been taken but no one
was injured. In this case, the victim was stabbed three times and bled to death. The knife used
to kill her was left at the scene and wiped clean of fingerprints, it is unclear if the knife belonged
to the victim or was brought to the scene by the perpetrator. The neighbor told police that he
saw the man leaving the victim’s apartment shortly after he had called the police.
The victim’s best friend told police that the victim had recently broken up with Frank
Parker. Parker had been dating the victim for several months. When the police talked to Parker,
he told them he was on the other side of town running errands. No one has been able to back up
Parker’s story. The police thought that Parker fit the description the victim’s neighbor gave of the
man he saw leaving the victim’s apartment after he called the police on the day she was
murdered. The police conducted a lineup with Parker. The neighbor picked Frank Parker out as
the man he saw leaving the victim’s apartment.
The police found several fingerprints that matched Frank Parker. Mr. Parker claims that
his prints were in the apartment from when he and the victim were dating. Mr. Parker also said
that he had not been in the victim’s apartment in the two weeks since they had broken up but
phone records indicate that Mr. Parker has been calling the victim several times a day over the
past two weeks and the victim had filed a restraining order against him.
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Appendix C: First Prosecution Decision
Please indicate on the following scale your decision as Prosecutor in the case against
Frank Parker. When making this decision, please keep in mind that the standard for
your decision should be probable cause, or reasonable belief, that the crime was
committed and that the suspect committed the crime.
________ 1. I would definitely charge Frank Parker with murder.
________ 2. I would probably charge Frank Parker with murder.
________ 3. I am somewhat inclined to charge Frank Parker with murder.
________ 4. I am somewhat inclined not to charge Frank Parker with murder.
________ 5. I would probably not charge Frank Parker with murder.
________ 6. I would definitely not charge Frank Parker with murder.
Please explain the reasoning for your decision.
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
Please sign to indicate that this represents your opinion.
X___________________________________________
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Appendix D: Weak Exculpatory Evidence
The police have uncovered additional information about this case. Mr. Parker gave the
police a cash register receipt from the day of the murder for a grocery store on the other
side of town. The receipt indicates that groceries were purchased at 10:40 a.m. and the
cashier remembered seeing Mr. Parker on the day in question.
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Appendix E: Strong Exculpatory Evidence
The police have uncovered additional information about this case. Mr. Parker
gave the police a cash register receipt from the day of the murder for a grocery store on
the other side of town. The receipt indicates that groceries were purchased at 10:40
a.m. and the cashier remembered seeing Mr. Parker on the day in question.
Additionally, DNA evidence from under the victim’s fingernails and blood found at the
crime scene do not match Frank Parker.
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Appendix F: Second Prosecution Decision
Please indicate on the following scale your decision as Prosecutor in the case against
Frank Parker. When making this decision, please keep in mind that the standard for
your decision should be probable cause, or reasonable belief, that the crime was
committed and that the suspect committed the crime.
________ 1. I would definitely charge Frank Parker with murder.
________ 2. I would probably charge Frank Parker with murder.
________ 3. I am somewhat inclined to charge Frank Parker with murder.
________ 4. I am somewhat inclined not to charge Frank Parker with murder.
________ 5. I would probably not charge Frank Parker with murder.
________ 6. I would definitely not charge Frank Parker with murder.
Please explain the reasoning for your decision.
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
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Appendix G: Pretrial Juror Attitudes Questionnaire
Directions: Please rate your agreement with the following items according to the 5-point
scale below. Please try to make a clear choice for each item (that is, only pick the
middle option if you have absolutely no opinion one way or the other). Pick only one
option for each item. Please read each item carefully and be as honest as possible.
1= strongly disagree
2=disagree
3=neither agree nor disagree
4=agree
5=strongly agree
1. If a suspect runs from police, then he probably committed the crime.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

2. A defendant should be found guilty if 11 out of 12 jurors vote guilty.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

3. Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

4. In most cases where the accused presents a strong defense, it is only because of a
good lawyer.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

5. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime with which
they are charged.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree
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4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

6. For serious crimes like murder, a defendant should be found guilty so long
as there is a 90% chance that he committed the crime.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

7. Defense lawyers don’t really care about guilt or innocence, they are just in business
to make money.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

8. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed
the crime.
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly
Disagree
Neither agree
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
nor disagree
Agree
9. Many accident claims filed against insurance companies are phony.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

10. The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

11. Extenuating circumstances should not be considered; if a person commits a crime,
then that person should be punished.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

12. If the defendant committed a victimless crime like gambling or possession of
marijuana, he should never be convicted.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree
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4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

13. Defense lawyers are too willing to defend individuals they know are guilty.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

14. Police routinely lie to protect other police officers.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

15. Once a criminal, always a criminal.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

16. Lawyers will do whatever it takes, even lie, to win a case.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

17. Criminals should be caught and convicted by “any means necessary.”
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

18. A prior record of conviction is the best indicator of a person’s guilt in the present
case.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

19. Rich individuals are almost never convicted of their crimes.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree
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20. If a defendant is a member of a gang, he/she is definitely guilty of the crime.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

21. Minorities use the “race issue” only when they are guilty.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

22. When it is the suspect’s word against the police officer’s, I believe the police.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

23. Men are more likely to be guilty of crimes than women.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

24. The large number of African-Americans currently in prison is an example of the
innate criminality of that subgroup.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

25. A black man on trial with a predominantly white jury will always be found guilty.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

26. Minority suspects are likely to be guilty, more often than not.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree
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4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

27. If a witness refuses to take a lie detector test, it is because he/she is hiding
something.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

28. Defendants who change their story are almost always guilty.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

29. Famous people are often considered to be “above the law.”
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither agree
nor disagree
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Appendix H: Self-Monitoring Questionnaire and Demographic Questionnaire
1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
TRUE

FALSE

2. My behavior is usually an expression of my true inner feelings, attitudes, and
beliefs.
TRUE

FALSE

3. At parties and social gatherings, I do no attempt to do or say things that others
will like.
TRUE

FALSE

4. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.
TRUE

FALSE

5. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no
information.
TRUE

FALSE

6. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people.
TRUE

FALSE

7. When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of
others for cues.
TRUE

FALSE

8. I would probably make a good actor.
TRUE

FALSE

9. I rarely need the advice of my friends to choose movies, books, or music.
TRUE

FALSE

10. I sometimes appear to others to experience deeper emotions than I actually am.
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TRUE

FALSE

11. I laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than when alone.
TRUE

FALSE

12. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
TRUE

FALSE

13. In different situations with different people, I often act like very different persons.
TRUE

FALSE

14. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
TRUE

FALSE

15. Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time.
TRUE

FALSE

16. I’m not always the person I appear to me.
TRUE

FALSE

17. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please
someone else or with their favor.
TRUE

FALSE

18. I have considered being an entertainer.
TRUE

FALSE

19. In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me to be rather
than anything else.
TRUE

FALSE

20. I have never been good at games like charades o improvisational acting.
TRUE

FALSE
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21. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different
situations.
TRUE

FALSE

22. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
TRUE

FALSE

23. I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite so well as I should.
TRUE

FALSE

24. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
TRUE

FALSE

25. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.
TRUE

FALSE

Demographic Questionnaire
What is your date of birth? _________
What is your gender?

Male

Female

What is your ethnicity?

Hispanic

African-American

Native-American

Non-Hispanic White

Asian

Other _________________

What is your major? _____________________
What is your first language?

English
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Spanish

Other___________

Appendix I: Debriefing Form
Prosecutorial Decision Making

IRB#

In the past ten years DNA testing has resulted in the release of many prisoners
who were in prison for crimes they did not commit. However, many prosecutors have
strongly resisted these prisoners’ release. Instead, the prosecutors have said that the
DNA must be wrong and the prisoners must be guilty.
Why do these prosecutors refuse to change their minds? Studies by social
psychologists may provide an answer. According to these studies, decisions are hard to
change once they have been made public. For instance, imagine two men, José and
Pablo. Imagine that José makes a decision and tells his friends about it. Pablo also
makes the same decision but does not tell his friends about it. According to the
research, José will be less likely than Pablo to change his mind later, even if there is
strong evidence he was wrong.

This example may help to explain why some

prosecutors do not change their minds. When prosecutors decide to prosecute a
suspect, they have to defend their decision publicly in court. It may be hard for them
change their mind later, even when DNA testing shows they were wrong.
In this study, we are testing this idea. Half of the students in the study were
asked to make a decision about how they would act as prosecutor in a murder case.
These students were informed that their decision would be posted publicly. The other
half of students were given the same case to read, but were not asked to make a public
decision about it. All students were then given evidence that the suspect may not have
committed the crime. Everyone was then asked to make a decision about how they
would act as prosecutor in the case.
We expect that students whose decisions were made public will have trouble
changing their minds, even when given strong evidence that the suspect was innocent.
If issues are presented by participating in this research study, there is
psychological treatment available at the University Counseling Center, telephone 7475302. If you have any questions or concerns about the research, you can contact the
primary investigator, Elizabeth Uhl at 747 – 8802, or the Faculty adviser, Dr. Jim Wood
at 747 –6570.
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